Michigan Law Review
Volume 52

Issue 8

1954

VENUE-THE NEED FOR A CHANGE IN THE VENUE PROVISIONS
OF THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT
S. I. Shuman S.Ed.
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, Legislation Commons,
and the Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
S. I. Shuman S.Ed., VENUE-THE NEED FOR A CHANGE IN THE VENUE PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1211 (1954).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol52/iss8/8

This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1954]

COMMENTS

1211

VENUE-THE NEED FOR A CHANGE IN THE VENUE PROVISIONS OF
FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AcT-In response to the need
created by a highly dangerous era of railroad employment,1 and subsequent to the passage of similar legislation in Europe,2 there was
enacted in 1906 a Federal Employers' Liability Act. 3 The attempted

THE

l Some indications as to the perilous nature of early railroad employment are suggested by ADAMs, NOTEs ON RAn.noAD AccmENTs (1879); Tait, "Railway Employee
Safety," 10 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 272 (1942); Griffith, "The Vindication of a National
Public Policy under the FELA," 18 I.Aw AND CoNTEM. PnoB. 160 (1953). It is not suggested that the perilous nature of operative railroad employment began with the driving of
the golden spike at Promontary, Utah and ended with the improvement of railroad equipment subsequent to the passage of the original Federal Safety Appliance Act, 27 Stat. L.
531 (1893). It is quite to the contrary; there are currently at least one hundred railroad
employees injured every day. See the address of Secretary of Labor, Maurice I. Tobin,
BUREAU OF LA.non STANDARDS BuL, No. 104, p. 1 et seq. (1948). Since 1888 there have
been 125,000 operative railroad employees killed and 4,293,326 injured. See ICC AcerDENT BuL. No. 119, appx. A, p. 112 et seq. (1951).
2 England enacted protective legislation in 1880 and Germany in 1884.
See
DAUGHERTY, LA.non PnoBLEMs IN AMERICAN lNnusTRY, 4th ed., 788 et seq. (1938). These
and other European and state efforts at solution of the problem were before the Congress
that enacted the Federal Employers' Liability Acts. See Hearings Before a Subcommittee
on the Committee Having under Consideration H. 239 and S. 156 and S. 1657, 59th
Cong., 1st sess. (1906); Hearings before the House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 17036,
60th Cong., 1st sess. (1908).
8 34 Stat. L. 232 (1906). The introduction of this act into Congress by President
Theodore Roosevelt was due largely to the efforts of Edward A. Mosely. See MoRGAN,
THE LrF:s Worut oF EnwARD A. MosELY IN THE SERVICE oF HuMANITY (1913); Griffith,
"The Vindication of a National Public Policy under the FELA," 18 LAW AND CoNTEM.
PRoB. 160 at 166 (1953).
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coverage of the first FELA was too broad to withstand the constitutional scrutiny of a five-to-four Supreme Court,4 and it consequently
remained for the Congress of 19085 to enact valid legislation for the
protection of the railroad employee.6 Whether or noi: the FELA is
the most efficacious solution to the problem of the injured railroad employee continues to be warmly debated,7 but for the present the act
provides one of the most heavily litigated8 of all federally created
rights capable of enforcement in state as well as federal courts.9 It
is with the venue features of the act that this comment is concerned.10
As enacted in 1908 the statute itself contained no special pro4 The [First] Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 28 S. Ct. 141 (1908). Justices
Moody, Harlan, McKenna, and Holmes dissented.
5 35 Stat. L. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. (1946) §§51-60. This act was passed two and
~e-half months after the Supreme Court invalidated the 1906 act. It too was pushed
through Congress by President Roosevelt. See 42 CoNG. Rllc. 1347 (1908).
6 Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 32 S. Ct. 169 (1911).
7 Tue obvious alternative of comprehensive workmen's compensation coverage has had
many staunch advocates, including past and present members of the Supreme Court. Justice
Frankfurter, concurring in Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 at 65, 69 S. Ct. 413
(1949), observed that a compensation act would correct the "cruel and wasteful mode of
dealing with industrial injuries" under the FELA. See also his concurring opinion in Urie
v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 at 196, 69 S. Ct. 1018 (1949). For a similar sentiment of
Chief Justice Taft see his address to the Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Law
Institute, 15 A.B.A.J. 332 (1929).
For the history of the congressional efforts at a compensation law to replace the FELA,
see Miller, "The Quest for a Federal Workmen's Compensation Law for Railroad Employees," 18 LAw AND CoNTllM. PROB. 188 (1953). Arguments on the merits of the question have been frequent. For some of the views and for citations to other writers, see
Pollack, ''Workmen's Compensation for Railroad Work Injuries and Diseases," 36 CoRN.
L. Q. 236 (1951) (favoring a compensation law); Richter and Forer, ''Federal Employers'
Liability Act-A Real Compensatory Law for Railroad Workers,'' 36 CoRN. L. Q. 203
(1951) (favoring retention of the FELA). Also see Parker, ''FELA or Uniform Compensation for All Workers?" 18 LAw AND CoNTllM. PROB. 208 (1953).
s Justice Frankfurter observed in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54 at
73, 63 S. Ct. 444 (1943): "Perhaps no field of the law comes closer to so many families
in this country than does the law of negligence, imbedded as it is in the Federal Employers'
Liability Act." During fiscal 1952 there were 1,231 cases commenced under the FELA in
the federal courts alone. In addition there were 2,227 personal injury actions commenced
under the Jones Act, 38 Stat. L. 1185 (1915), as amended by 41 Stat. L. 1007 (1926),
46 U.S.C. (1946) §688. Negligence questions under the Jones Act are decided in accordance with the decisions under the FELA. See the ANNuAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OP
THE ADMINISTRATIVE DFFICB OP THE UNITED STATES CounTS 126-127 (1952).
9 36 Stat. L. 291 (1910), as amended, 45 U.S.C. (1946) §56 provides that "an action
may be brought in a circuit court of the United States, in the district of the residence of
the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be
doing business at the time of commencing such action."
10 The venue provisions of the FELA have been a constant source of dissatisfaction to
railroad employees and employers since the original enactment of the legislation. See Gibson, "The Venue Clause and Transportation of Lawsuits," 18 LAW AND CoNTllM. PROB.
367 (1953); Martin, "Improper Venue under the FELA," 3 WASH. & LBB L. Rllv. 247
(1942); Braucher, "The Inconvenient Federal Forum," 60 HARv. L. Rllv. 908 (1947);
Richter and Forer, "The Federal Employers' Liability Act," 12 F.R.D. 13 at 60 et seq.
(1952); 39 YALE L. J. 388 at 393 et seq. (1930); 44 h.L. L. Rllv. 75 (1949); 46 ILL. L.
Rllv. 115 at 117 et seq. (1951).
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vis10ns for the venue of actions ansmg thereunder and venue was
consequently governed by the narrow provisions of the then existing
general federal venue statute.11 Under this statute venue was restricted to the federal district courts in the district in which the defendant resided. Congressional reaction12 against this restriction13
upon what was intended to be humanitarian legislation resulted in
the 1910 amendment to the act.14 Under the amendment venue was
provided wherever the defendant did business, or at the plaintiff's
residence, or where the cause of action arose. As a result of these
broad provisions for the choice of venue there developed the practice
of extensive transportation of lawsuits to forums chosen not always
for their convenience, nor even for their history of generosity to plaintiffs, but chosen rather to induce large settlements by offering as an
alternative the defense of a lawsuit in a distant, inconvenient forum.
As the FELA actions gravitated toward the "plaintiffs' courts" there
evolved extensive systems of ambulance chasers composed of attorneys
familiar with these courts. Not only did these attorneys offer familiarity with the forum, but they also assured the injured plaintiff
of a larger recovery or settlement than could have been obtained elsewhere. Indeed, they sometimes even lent the plaintiff money in order
to tide him over during the litigation.111
11 25 Stat. L. 433 (1888).
12 See S. Rep. No. 432, 61st

Cong., 2d sess. (1910); H. Rep. No. 17263, 61st Cong.,
2d sess. (1910); 45 CoNc. R.Ec. 2253-2260, 3993-3998, 4034-4051, 4091-4100, 4120-4124
(1910).
13 The restriction was made even greater than necessai:y by the refusal of state courts
to entertain jurisdiction on the grounds that it would be contrai:y to the congressional intent.
Hoxie v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 82 Conn. 352, 73 A. 754 (1909). Although this
was clearly erroneous [see 25 Stat. L. 433 (1888) and the Second Employers' Liability
Cases, 223 U.S. 1 at 56, 32 S. Ct. 169 (1911)], the 1910 amendment specifically provided
for concurrent jurisdiction. See Gibson, "The Venue Clause and Transportation of Lawsuits," 18 LAw AND CoNTEM. PnoB. 367 at 369 (1953).
14 36 Stat. L. 291 (1910), 45 U.S.C. (1946) §56.
15 The states most favorable to plaintiffs for negligence actions are generally thought
to be Minnesota, Illinois, New York, Missouri, and California. See hearings before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 1639, 80th Cong., 1st
sess. (1947); Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciai:y United
States Senate on H.R. 1639 and S. 1567, 80th Cong., 2d sess. (1948). In a five year
period ending in 1946, of all the suits begun in federal district courts other than those of
the place where the injury occurred, ninety-two percent were commenced in the above five
named states. H. Rep. No. 613, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947).
In a note to Justice Brandeis' majority opinion in Davis v. Farmers Co-operative Equity
Co., 262 U.S. 312 at 316, 43 S. Ct. 556 (1923), it is stated: "A message, dated February
2, 1923 of the Governor of Minnesota to its Legislature, recites that a recent examination
of the calendars of the district courts in 67 of the 87 counties of the State disclosed that in
those counties there were then pending 1,028 personal injury cases in which nonresident
plaintiffs seek damages aggregating nearly $26,000,000 from foreign railroad corporations
which do not operate any line within Minnesota.'' The Minnesota situation has received
additional unfavorable comment. See Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R. Co. v. Wolf, 199 Wis.
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In an effort to diminish the effects of the wide venue choice of
their employees, the railroads have utilized, with varying degrees of
success, at least three devices. The one which has in recent times
been most vigorously employed and which currently maintains the
greatest vitality is the doctrine of forum non conveniens. But in order
to appreciate better the use of this device it may be well to examine
briefly the use, and the reasons for the current disuse, of the other
devices.

I. Contracts Restricting Choice of Venue
Prior to the 1949 decision of the Supreme Court in Boyd v. -Grand
Trunk Western R. Co.,1 6 several state and lower federal courts had
sustained the validity of contracts between railroads and employees,
whereby the latter, for a consideratiol), agreed to pursue their rights
under the FELA in some particular forum. Venue-restricting coven278, 226 N.W. 297 (1929); Chunes v. Duluth, W. & P. Ry. Co., (D.C. Minn. 1924) 298

F. 964. lliinois, especially Chicago, has also been a favored forum for injured plaintiffsor perhaps more accurately for their attorneys. In Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Andrews,
338 ill. App. 552, 88 N.E. (2d) 346 (1949), the court enjoined an attorney from maintaining an extensive solicitation operation headquartered in Chicago. This industrious
attorney was litigating ninety-two FELA cases in Chicago, in which the claims approached
$5,000,000. It has not been unknown for these Minnesota and Chicago importation organizations to make advances to plaintiffs pending judgment in their cause, to provide entertainment for the plaintiffs, and to maintain standing groups of expert witnesses.
The abuse of venue privileges was thought to so interfere with the war effort that in
World War I, W. G. McAdoo, Director General of the Railroads, issued General Orders
Nos. 18 and 18a (1918), which restricted venue to the place of the plaintiff's residence
or the place where the cause of action arose. Although originally held unconstitutional by
state and lower federal courts as applied to FELA cases, the orders were sustained by the
Supreme Court in Alabama & Vicksburg Ry. Co. v. Journey, 257 U.S. 111, 42 S. Ct. 6
(1921). During World War II, without the promulgation of any executive order, it was
held that the interference with the war effort did not affect the statutory venue privileges
of plaintiffs. See Union Pacific R. Co. v. Utterback, 173 Ore. 572, 146 P. (2d) 76
(1944), cert. den. 323 U.S. 711, 65 S. Ct. 36 (1944). Also see "Actions Against Railroads under the Federal Control," 23 LAw NoTEs 46 (1919).
The unsavory practices encouraged by the FELA venue provisions has received considerable attention. See especially Gibson, "The Venue Clause and Transportation of
Lawsuits,'' 18 LAw AND CoNTEM. PROB. 367 (1953); Henderson, "The 'Exportation' of
Personal Injury and Death Claims," 13 DETROIT B. Q. 11 (1945); Winters, "Interstate
Commerce in Damage Suits,'' 29 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 135 (1946); Barrett, "The Doctrine of
Forum Non Conveniens," 35 CALIF. L. RBv. 380 (1947); Gay, ''Venue of Actions: Bill
to Curb Shopping for Forums Is Urged,'' 33 A.B.A.J. 659 (1947); 29 IND. L. J. 97 (1953).
Also see Remmers, ''Recent Legislation Affecting the Place of Trial: Forum Non Conveniens,'' CururaNT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION 355-356 (1952); 39 YALE L. J. 388
at 399 et seq. (1930); 15 MINN. L. RBv. 83 at 94 (1930); 46 W. VA. L. Q. 344 at 346
(1940); 15 UNIV. Cm. L. RBv. 332 at 340 (1948); 44 ILL. L. RBv. 75 at 77 et s~q.
(1949); 27 TEX. L. RBv. 698 at 703 (1949); 34 MINN. L. RBv. 145 (1950); 30 N.C.L.
RBv. 168 (1952).
16 338

U.S. 263, 70 S. Ct. 26 (1949).
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ants were thought not to violate the specific language of section 51 7
of the act, on the theory that choice of venue is a privilege and hence
may be waived, or that reasonable contracts which prevent "forum
shopping" are not violative of public policy.18 On the other hand,
a substantial number of courts held that these venue-restricting covenants were invalid, either on the ground that they were contrary to
the expressed congressional intent or, by appeal to Hohfeldian analysis,
on the ground that Congress in prohibiting contracts limiting the employer's liability under the FELA thereby also prohibited contracts
restricting the employee's venue choice, since such contracts may
operate to limit the employer's liability.19 The Supreme Court in
holding that the "right to bring suit in any eligible forum is a right
of sufficient substantiality to be included within the Congressional
mandate of §5"20 was apparently relying upon the argument from the
Hohfeldian analysis of liability.
17 Sec. 5 essentially provides that "any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever,
the purpose or intent.of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from
any liability created by this Act, shall to that extent be void. . • ." 35 Stat. L. 66 (1908),
45 u.s.c. (1946) §55.
18 The argument for venue choice as a privilege stems from dictum in Neirbo Co. v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 164, 60 S. Ct. 153 (1939). See Clark v. Lowden, (D.C. Minn. 1942) 48 F. Supp. 261; Roland v. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co., (D.C. Ill.
1946) 65 F. Supp. 630; 44 ILL. L. REv. 75 at 84 et seq. (1949).
19 In general, restricting covenants have been looked upon with suspicion as against
public policy. See 6 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTs, rev. ed., §1725 (1938); 2 CoNTRACTS
REsTATEMENT §558 (1932); Insurance Co. v. Morse, 30 Wall. (87 U.S.) 445 (1874);
Judge Hand concurring in Krenger v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (2d Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d)
556 at 561. But when, as is the case with regard to the FELA, there is a special venue
provision and the legislation itself reveals an intent to favor the injured employee, e.g., by
removing the common law defenses of the fellow servant rule, 35 Stat. L. 65 (1908), as
amended, 45 U.S.C. (1946) §51, contributory negligence, 35 Stat. L. 66 (1908), as
amended, 45 U.S.C. (1946) §53, and assumption of risk, 35 Stat. L. 66 (1908), as
amended, 45 U.S.C. (1946) §54, it becomes even more apparent, some courts have argued,
that the congressional policy was to prevent any interference with any of the plaintiff's
rights under the statute which may result in recovery for the injury. Actually, this argument is not too persuasive, except against the background of the fact that the railroads are
generally able to secure favorable venue covenants from prospective plaintiffs because of
the financial plight in which the employees or the employees' survivors frequently find
themselves immediately after the injury. See Porter v. Fleming, (D.C. Minn. 1947)
74 F. Supp. 378; Pryor v. Union Pacific R. Co., (Cal. App. 1949) 205 P. (2d) 471,
revd. 34 Cal. (2d) 724, 214 P. (2d) 377 (1950); 38 CALIF. L. REv. 524 at 526 (1950);
23 TEMPLE L. Q. 428 at 429 (1950). Because of such policy arguments, rather than
because of the grounds actually relied upon by the Court, the Boyd decision has found
support. See, e.g., 48 MicH. L. REv. 527 (1950); 23 TEMPLE L. Q. 428 (1950). There
have also been those who were impressed by the Hohfeldian argument that "any contract"
affecting ''liability," as that term is used in §5, is wide enough to include venue covenants.
See Judge Clark in Krenger v. Pennsylvania R. Co., supra; 23 So. CAL. L. REv. 388
(1950). Also see 29 NEB. L. REv. 129 (1949).
20 Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 338 U.S. 263 at 265, 70 S.Ct. 26 (1949).
See HoHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CoNCBPTIONS 8, 50, 58-60 (1923). Also see Corbin,
''Legal Analysis and Terminology," 29 YALE L. J. 163 at 170 (1919); 3 VANDERllILT L.
REv. 160 (1949).
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It is important to note that the Boyd decision specifically avoided
impairing the force of Callen v. Pennsylvania R. Co.21 which sustained
the validity of a full compromise agreement between the ·plaintiff
employee and the defendant railroad. Such contracts avoid all litigation, whereas the venue restriction contract operates to obstruct
maximum recovery should the employee elect to proceed to trial.22
One further limitation upon what might have been thought to be an
effect of the Boyd case was settled in South Buffalo Ry. Co. v. Ahern,23
where it was held that the voluntary submission to a permissive state
workmen's compensation statute estopped the later dissatisfied railroad
from resisting the award by claiming that the employee should have
pursued his rights under the FELA. Although the Ahern case does
not decide the question, .it does suggest that an employee would likewise be estopped from pursuing his rights under the FEtA after
once submitting his personal injury claim, pursuant to agreement, to
some permissive machinery established by state law-provided· he does
so voluntarily and with knowledge as to the legal effects of his acts.
Thus, although a covenant limiting the employee's choice of venue
is per se illegal, the employer railroad may avoid defending an action
in a distant, inconvenient forum, if a full release can be negotiated,
or if the employee elects, und~r proper safeguards, to submit to the
administrative procedure of a state agency. For fairly obvious reasons,
neither alternative will prove of practical value in preventing abuse
of the FELA venue provisions.
There is one further aspect of the negotiated release situation
which merits attention, since under certain circumstances the release
may be an effective way to limit the employee's venue choice should
he elect to pursue rights under the FELA despite the release. Although there is as yet a paucity of case law on the point, the problem
may become more acute as wider use is made- of the declaratory judgment procedure. Illustrative of what is here involved is Zayatz v.
21332 U.S. 625; 68 S. Ct. 296 (1948).
22See Duncan v. Thompson, 315 U.S. 1, 62 S. Ct. 422 (1942). It has been ·argued
with some cogency that if a complete release in all forums may be valid, then why not a
release in some forums? See 62 HARv. L. RP.v. 134 at 135 (1948). Also see.34 M:rnN.
L. RP.v. 342 (1950).
23 344 U.S. 367, 73 S. Ct. 340 (1953). The permissive character of the New York
statute was of integral importance in enabling the Court to say that the state statute did
not confilct with the congressional enactment in the field, despite the strong presumption
to the contrary. See GAVIT, THE CoMMERCB CuusE §118 (1932); 86 Umv. PA. L.
RP.v. 532 at 538 et seq. (1938). Criticizing the Ahem decision is 5 STAN, L. RP.v. 338
(1953). Also see 29 N. Y. UNIV. L. REv. 228 (1954).
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Southern Ry. Co.24 where an employee, after executing a release, contemplated pursuing his rights under the FELA in a foreign forum
and the employer railroad, upon learning this fact, asked for a declaratory judgment construing the release and an injunction to -prevent
the foreign proceeding. Stating that the FELA was not involved,
the Supreme Court of Alabama granted both of the remedies sought
by the railroad, and certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court. Since a declaratory judgment is generally available to
test a written instrument,25 and since a decision construing the validity
of the release in such- a proceeding may be res judicata on the issue,
the employer would have an effective means for limiting the employee's
foreign FELA proceeding should the release be judged valid. 26 There
are at least two reasons why there are so few instances of such cases:
(I) the employer must secure a valid release, and (2) even more
important, the employer will be unable to secure a declaratory judgment construing the release once the employee has actually instituted
a foreign proceeding in which the issue would be resolved.27

IL Injunctions against Foreign Suits
Successful avoidance of venue abuses requires the intervention of
either the legislature or the judiciary for, so long as the employee
alone is able to control the choice of venue, defense of a suit in an
inconvenient, distant forum continues to impede settlements based
solely on the merits of the case. One device has been appeal to the
long recognized power of equity courts, acting as they do in personam,
to enjoin a litigant subject to the court's jurisdiction from bringing or
continuing an action in a foreign forum. 28 Invoking this power
generally requires that both parties be residents of the state of the
enjoining forum, that the state of the forum be the situs of the injury,
24 248 Ala. 137, 26 S. (2d) 545 (1946), cert. den. 329 U.S. 789, 67 S.Ct. 353
(1946). See 42 ILL. L. REv. 112 (1947); 44 ILL. L. REv. 75 at 85 (1949). Also see
45 YALE L. J. 1235 at 1242 (1936).
25BoRCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, 2d ed., 499 (1941).
2s Callen v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 332 U.S. 625, 68 S. Ct. 296 (1948).
:i.1 See Pacific Electric Ry. Co. v. Dewey, 95 Cal. App. (2d) 69, 212 P. (2d) 255
(1949); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Zimmer, 87 Cal. App. (2d) 524, 197 P. (2d) 363 (1948).
28 Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 10 S. Ct. 269 (1890); 2 STORY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE, 14th ed., §§1224, 1225 (1918); 2 RoBERTs, FEDERAL LIABILITIES OP
CARIUERS §962 (1929). Also see Ex parte Crandall, (7th Cir. 1931) 53 F. (2d) 969,
cert. den. 285 U.S. 540, 52 S. Ct. 312 (1932); Helsell, "Injunctive Relief Against Oppressive Suits in Foreign Jurisdictions," 12 F.R.D. 502 (1952); Messner, "The Jurisdiction of
a Court of Equity over Persons to Compel the Doing of Acts Outside the Territorial Limits
of the States," 14 MINN. L. REv. 494 (1930).
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and that permitting the foreign action would be inequitable and unjust, rather than merely inconvenient.29
When there was compliance with these requirements, the majority of the state courts asked to enjoin an PELA action in a sister
state granted the injunction, and some, though not a majority, would
also enjoin PELA actions in foreign federal courts. 30 However, in
the Kepner case31 the Supreme Court decided that actions in foreign
federal courts may not be enjoined, and in the Miles case32 the same
reasoning operated to conclude that actions in foreign stat~ courts
could not be enjoined. These decisions were based not upon notions
of comity, nor essentially upon equal protection considerations, but
rather upon the fact that Congress had spoken and indicated that the
employee's choice of venue is not to be frustrated by reasons of convenience or expense to the employer railroad. With this as the basis
for the decisions, and with Justice Jackson's pronouncement in the
20 See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper & C. Co., 74 N.J. Eq. 457, 71 A. 153
(1908); Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 10 S.Ct. 269 (1890). A leading case involving an FELA action is Reed's Admx. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 182 Ky. 455, 206 S.W.
794 (1918). Also see 46 h.L. L. REv. 115 at 119 et seq. (1951); 31 MICH. L. REv. 88
(1932). Annotations on the power to enjoin foreign FELA actions are found in 85
A.L.R. 1351 (1933); 113 A.L.R. 1444 (1938); 136 A.L.R. 1232 (1942); 146 A.L.R.
1118 (1943). That mere inconvenience was insufficient grounds to enjoin the ·foreign
proceeding seems to have been the general rule. See, e.g., Illinois Life Ins. Co. v. Prentiss,
277 ill. 383, 115 N.E. 554 (1917); Southern Pacific Co. v. Baum, 39 N.M. 22, 38 P.
(2d) 1106 (1934). Also see Pound, "The Progress of the Law-Equity," 33 HAnv. L.
REv. 420 at 425 et seq. (1920); 45 YALE L. J. 1235 at 1240 (1936); 27 IowA L. REv. 76
(1941); 56 YALE L. J. 1234 at 1236 (1947).
30 The important cases and the development up to the time of the Supreme Court
decisions in the area are considered in Gibson, "The Venue Clause and Transportation of
Lawsuits," 18 LAw AND CoNTEM, PnoB. 367 at 407 et seq. (1953); 3 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 247 (1942). Also see 27 N.C.L. REv. 248 (1949); 46 h.L. L. REv. 115 at 119
et seq. (1951); Warren, "Federal and State Court Interference," 43 HARv. L. REv. 345
(1930).
31Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 62 S.Ct. 6 (1941). Interestingly,
almost all the comment elicited by the decision was unfavorable, either because the reasoning of the Court was considered unpersuasive or because the implications of the language
used in the decision indicated that venue abuses were to be tolerated. See 8 UNIV. Cm.
L. REv. 789 (1941) (which even suggested that upon reconsideration of the question
Kepner would be overruled); 8 Omo ST. L. J. 115 (1941); 27 CoRN. L. Q. 273 (1942);
20 N.C.L. REv. 210 (1942); 16 TuLANE L. REv. 290 (1942); 14 RocKY MT. L. REv.
126 (1942). Some writers thought the decision commendable, because, among other reasons, it would avoid the type of confusion considered in Southern Ry. Co. v. Painter, (8th
Cir. 1941) 117 F. (2d) 10.0, a confusion which resulted from enjoining a proceeding already
begun. See 51 YALE L. J. 343 (1941); 90 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 489 (1942); 26 MINN. L.
REv. 404 (1942).
32 Miles v. illinois Central R. Co., 315 U.S. 698, 62 S.Ct. 827 (1942). This decision
also met with almost uniformly unfavorable reception, either because it permitted an excess
burden on the wartime railroads, 41 MlcH. L. REv. 537 (1942), or because the Court
should not have presumed that Congress intended to sanction vexatious litigation without
more specific language in the statute, 90 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 964 (1942). Also see 3
WASH, & LEE L. REv. 247 at 267 et seq. (1942).
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Mayfield case that "by amendment, 28 U.S.C. §1404(a), as interpreted in Ex parte Collett, . . . Congress has removed the compulsion
which determined the Miles case, and the Missouri Court should no
longer regard it as controlling,"33 it is not difficult to appreciate why
the Georgia Supreme Court decided that the enactment of section
1404(a) of the Judicial Code34 permitted the enjoining of FELA
actions in foreign state courts.35 Section l 404(a), which in Ex parte
Collett3 6 the Supreme Court held applied to FELA actions, permits
federal courts to transfer an action to a more convenient federal forum.
Despite the attractiveness of the argument that enactment of section
l 404(a) altered the congressional attitude toward the problem as
decided in the Kepner and Miles cases, and although the reviser's notes
to section l 404(a) specifically mentioned the Kepner case as illustrative of the need for the recommended change, the Court decided in
Pope 11. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.37 that state courts were unable
to enjoin FELA actions in foreign, inconvenient state forums. 38 Chief
Justice Vinson spoke for eight members of the Court, saying that the
Kepner and Miles cases were deliberately left intact in the congressional enactment of section 1404(a), since in that section Congress
spoke only to the federal courts and made no provision for permitting
the venue question to be "raised and settled by the initiation of a
33 Missouri
34 62 Stat.

ex rel. Southern Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 at 5, 71 S.Ct. 1 (1950).
L. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §1404(a) provides: ''For
the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may
transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought."
See 27 Tm:. L. REv. 698 (1949); 44 h.r.. L. REv. 75 (1949); 37 CALIF. L. REv. 697
(1949). These notes were concerned with whether §1404(a) would apply to the special
venue statutes, e.g., the PELA and the Sherman Act. Also see Harris, "Survey of the
Federal Judicial Code," 3 SOUTHWESTERN L. J. 229 at 235 (1949); 18 J.B.A. KAN. 242
(1949); "New Judicial Code and Forum Non Conveniens," 1 STAN. L. REv. 497 (1949).
35 Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Pope, 209 Ga. 187, 71 S.E. (2d) 243 (1952). But
the Florida court held that despite §l404(a) the Miles case was decisive of the question.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Wood, (Fla. 1952) 58 S. (2d) 549. See 26 So. CAL. L.
REv. 210 (1953) (commenting on the two cases); 29 hm. L. J. 97 at 101 (1953).
36 337 U.S. 55, 69 S.Ct. 944 (1949). This decision has not evoked the unfavorable
reception which followed the Kepner and Miles cases. See 48 MicH. L. REv. 366 (1950);
34 MINN. L. REv. 145 (1950); 24 TuLANn L. REv. 247 at 248 et seq. (1949).
37 345 U.S. 379, 73 S.Ct. 749 (1953). See 52 MICH. L. REv. 447 (1954); ''The
Supreme Court, 1952 Term,'' 67 HARv. L. REv. 91 at 149 (1953); 6 UNIV. FLA. L. REv.
262 (1953). In these discussions it was recognized that the Pope decision in effect sanctioned the continuance of the unwholesome practices which had been occurring under the
PELA venue provisions.
38 Although the strong language in the opinion fairly conclusively suggests the
answer, there does remain the question of whether a state court may enjoin an PELA
action brought in a foreign federal forum. Prior to the Miles and Kepner cases some state
courts, clearly not a majority, had enjoined such actions, and it may be argued that since
§1404(a) recognizes the inequity of a suit in an inconvenient federal forum, state courts
may enjoin such proceedings and, in effect, transfer them to the enjoining jurisdiction.
See 16 Mo. L. REv. 174 at 178 (1951).
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second law suit in a court in a foreign jurisdiction."39 Section l 4O4(a)
provides for the transfer of the action to a different, more convenient
federal forum, whereas enjoining a foreign action requires the plaintiff
to institute a new proceeding. Justice Frankfurter dissented in the
Pope case, as he had in Kepner and Miles.
Thus, once again, the railroads need look elsewhere if they are to
£nd relief from the defense of a suit in an inconvenient, distant
forum. 40 Injunction, as inefficacious as it may be,4 1 is not available.

III. Forum Non Conveniens
Although the historical origins of the doctrine of forum non conveniens42 are uncertain, it appears that the practice was well known
in Scotland by at least the late nineteenth century,43 and that some
very early American courts, without designating the practice by name,
39Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 345 U.S. 379 at 384, 73 S.Ct. 749 (1953).
40 ''When the bars were let down in the Kepner and Miles cases the length of haul
began to grow. Previously for the most part claims had been imported from adjoining
or adjacent states. In the Kepner case it was 700 miles from Ohio to New York. In the
Utterback case it was 1150 miles from Portland, Oregon to Los Angeles. Eventually it
reached almost from ocean to ocean. The Southern Pacific Company with eastern termini
at Ogden and New Orleans was held to be doing business in New York and therefore
subject to suit under the Act by an administrator for the death of an employee living and
working in Arizona where he maintained his residence at the time of his death." Gibson,
"The Venue Clause and Transportation of Lawsuits," 18 LAw AND CoNTEM. PROB, 367
at 418 (1953).
41 Even were injunction available to defendant railroads, it would not provide a very
satisfactory remedy. The enjoined party can avoid compliance with the decree by continued absence from the enjoining jurisdiction. See Kempson v. Kempson, 63 N.J. Eq.
783, 52 A. 360 (1902). Recognizing that the injured plaintiff may thus avoid the injunction, one court also enjoined his attorney and witnesses. See New York, C. & St. L.
R. Co. v. Perdiue, 97 Ind. App. 517, 187 N.E. 349 (1933). But an even greater infumity of the injunction remedy is the fact that the decree may not be entitled to full
faith in the state where the plaintiff has brought his action or where he afterward proceeds to bring his action. See Foster, "Place of Trial in Civil Actions," 43 HARv. L. REv.
1217 at 1245 et seq. (1930); Frye v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 157 Minn. 52, 195
N.W. 629 (1923), cert. den. 263 U.S. 723, 44 S.Ct. 231 (1924); 72 Umv. PA. L.
REv. 429 (1924); 39 YALE L. J. 719 (1930); 45 YALE L. J. 1235 at 1241 (1936); 56
YALE L. J. 1234 at 1236 et seq. (1947); 29 hm. L. J. 97 at 103 (1953).
42 For general discussions of the doctrine, see Blair, ''The Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens in Anglo-American Law," 29 CoL. L. REv. 1 (1929); Dainow, "The Inappropriate Forum," 29 !LI.. L. REv. 867 (1935); Foster, "Place 0£ Trial in Civil Actions,"
43 HARv. L. REv. 1217 (1930); Braucher, "The Inconvenient Federal Forum," 60 HARv.
L. REv. 908 (1947); Barrett, ''The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens," 35 CAuF. L.
REv. 380 (1947).
43 For the historical background and development of the doctrine, see in addition to
the articles cited in the previous footnote 56 YALE L. J. 1234 at 1235 et seq. (1947). On
the Scottish practice see GmB, THE rnTERNATIONAL LAw OF JumsDICTION IN ENGLAND
AND ScoTLAND 212 et seq. (1926); GLOAG AND HENDERSON, lNrnoDUCTION TO THE !..Aw
oF Scon.AND, 5th ed., 24 (1952).
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were refusing jurisdiction in certain cases.44 The phrase "forum non
conveniens" may actually have been used in court opinions prior to
Blair's classic article,4 5 but it was not until after that article was published that American courts began to recognize the doctrine by name.
Justice Jackson has suggested that it was probably Justice Cardozo
who first referred to the doctrine by name in a Supreme Court opinion
in 1932.46 However, the Court had recognized the doctrine as early
as 1903,41 · and in 1929, in Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co.,4 8
the Court expressly held that a New York state court might refuse
to hear a FELA cause even though the court had jurisdiction.
Although it is now clear that in some circumstances the refusal
of a court to hear a case over which it has properly acquired jurisdiction is not violative of the Federal Constitution, the early application of forum non conveniens was thought to raise serious problems
of due process, privileges and immunities, full faith and credit, and
equal protection. At first blush it may appear that a plaintiff is deprived of "property" without due process if a court with proper jurisdiction refuses to enforce his rights. 49 However, the objection has
very seldom been raised, and even if it were urged it is unlikely to be
successful, since, among other reasons, the proposition requires the
assumption that the plaintiff does have a right everywhere enforceable.
Similarly unavailing in resisting the application of forum non conveniens is appeal to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This is so since the clause does not prohibit reasonable
44 See 32 A.L.R. 6 (1924); Barrett, ''The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens," 35
CALIP. L. REv. 380 at 387, n. 36 (1947). In admiralty courts especially the doctrine
received early application. The explanation for this lies in the fact that forum non conveniens was readily applied in the type of case which frequently arose in an admiralty
court, i.e., one involving foreigners and the application of law other than that of the
forum. See the dictum by Justice Marshall in Mason v. Ship Blaireau, 2 Cranch
(6 U.S.) 240 at 246 (1804). Also see The Maggie Hammond, 9 Wall. (76 U.S.) 435
(1869); 15 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 332 (1948).
45 Blair, "The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law," 29
Cor.. L. REv. 1 (1929). It is this article which is generally thought to have led to the
development of the current doctrine of forum non conveniens.
46The opinion was Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 at 151, 53 S.Ct. 295
(1933). Jackson, ''Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution," 45
CoL. L. REv. 1 at 30 et seq. (1945).
47 Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U.S. 373, 24 S.Ct. 92
(1903).
48279 U.S. 377, 49 S.Ct. 355 (1929).
49 See Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 208 U.S. 570, 28 S.Ct. 337 (1908). Also
see Hansell, ''The Proper Forum For Suits Against Foreign Corporations," 27 Cor.. L.
REv. 12 at 19 et seq. (1927), where it is suggested that the due process argument is
somewhat circular, since for plaintiff to assert a deprivation of property without due process
means that it has already been decided that the plaintiff has a cause of action (property)
everywhere enforceable.
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classifications of litigants, but rather prohibits unequal treatment of
litigants in the same class. Consequently a state statute or court rule
which resulted in dismissal of all actions between nonresidents on
a foreign cause of action would be unlikely to offend the equal protection clause.50 The constitutional full faith and credit requirement
is not relevant to PELA actions dismissed in response to a plea of
inconvenient forum, but may be relevant in other types of cases where
the defendant's plea is complied with because the forum does not wish
to apply a foreign state law. But even in such cases full faith niay
not be violated unless the sole grounds for finding inconvenience was
the presence of the foreign state law.51 The most vigorous constitutional objection to forum non conveniens is the charge that the privileges and immunities clause is violated by the doctrine. This view
is largely attributable to the frequently quoted and approved dictum
of Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryell,52 in which he indicated
that only those privileges and immunities which were in their nature
fundamental were protected by the Constitution, and that included
among these fundamental privileges was the "right to institute and
maintain actions of any kind" in the state courts. However, by positing
a distinction between citizenship and residence, artificial as such a
distinction may be,53 and by basing the refusal to hear certain causes
50 Reasonable procedural discriminations against nomesidents have long been permitted.
See Chemung Canal Bank v. Lowery, 93 U.S. 72 (1876); Canadian Northern Ry. Co. v.
Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 40 S.Ct. 402 (1920); Douglas v. New York, N.H. and H. R. Co.,
279 U.S. 377, 49 S.Ct. 355 (1929); 18 CALIP. L. REv. 159 (1930).
51 See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 71 S.Ct. 980 (1951). But see Broderick v.
Rosner, 294 :U.S. 629 at 643, 55 S.Ct. 589 (1935); Williams v. North Carolina, 317
U.S. 287 at 294, 63 S.Ct. 207 (1942). Actually the full faith type problem which arose
in the prior cases involving full faith and forum non conveniens, Anglo-American Provision
Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U.S. 373, 24 S.Ct. 92 (1903), and Kenney v. Supreme
Lodge, 252 U.S. 411, 40 S.Ct. 371 (1920), are not very important in regard to FELA
actions. In those cases after securing a judgment elsewhere plaintiff sought to enforce the
judgment in a forum which would not have been willing to hear the original action.
However, in FELA cases it is unlikely that any judgment recovered against the defendant
will be uncollectible within the state of the forum. On the relation between forum non
conveniens and full faith, see Blair, "The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in AngloAmerican Law," 29 CoL. L. REv. 1 at 4 et seq. (1929); Jackson, ''Full Faith and CreditThe Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution," 45 CoL. L. REv. 1 (1945); Remmers, "Recent
Legislation Affecting Place of Trial; Forum Non Conveniens," CUIU\ENT TRENDS IN STATB
LEGISLATION 355 at 364 et seq. (1952).
52 (C. C. Pa. 1823) 6 Fed. Cas. 546, No. 3230. That the right to bring suit is
constitutionally protected, see Chambers v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 28 S.Ct.
34 (1907).
53 The artificiality of the distinction has long been recognized. See Meyers, "The
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the Several States," 1 MrcH. L. REv. 364 at 382
(1903). Also see tlie note on Collard v. Beach, 81 App. Div. 582, 81 N.Y.S. 619 (1903)
(where an early New York decision did recognize the distinction) in 17 HARv. L. REv. 54
(1903). An even earlier New York case averring to the distinction is Robinson v. Oceanic
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upon the nonresidence of the litigants, rather than upon their noncitizenship, state courts have been able to make applications of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens which have withstood Supreme
Court examination as to constitutionality.54 Regardless of the Supreme .Court approval, a very substantial number of states still refuse
to make forum non conveniens a part of their procedure, either because state statutes are said to deprive the courts of discretion to refuse
jurisdiction or because the doctrine is said to be in violation of the
privileges and immunities clause even though the Supreme Court has
held to the contrary where criteria other than citizenship determine
the issue.55
Despite the early decision in the Douglas case upholding the refusal of a New York court to hear a FELA action properly before the
court, the constitutionality of dismissing a FELA case in response to
a plea of inconvenient forum has been fraught with uncertainty. The
Kepner and Miles cases were thought to have so impaired the Douglas
holding that in Leet v. Union Paci-fie R. Co.56 the California Supreme
Court decided that the special venue provisions of the FELA could
not be avoided by a plea of forum non conveniens. When the SuSteam Navigation Co., 112 N.Y. 315, 19 N.E. 625 (1889). Defending the distinction
between residence and citizenship is Hansell, ''The Proper Forum for Suits Against Foreign
Corporations," 27 CoL. L. REv. 12 at 16-18 (1927). Also see 41 HA:av. L. REv. 387
(1928); 28 CoL. L. REv. 347 (1928).
54 In Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 19 S.Ct. 165 (1898), the Court rejected the
discriminations based on a distinction between "residents" and "citizens,'' Justice Brewer
dissenting. This view again prevailed two years later in Sully v. American National Bank,
178 U.S. 289, 20 S.Ct. 935 (1900). However, in La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S.
465, 39 S.Ct. 160 (1919), the Court accepted the position of Justice Brewer, and this
view has since prevailed. Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525, 40 S.Ct. 2 (1919); Canadian
Northern Ry. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 40 S.Ct. 402 (1920); Douglas v. New York,
N.H. & H. R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 49 S.Ct. 355 (1929); Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. Co.
v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 71 S.Ct. 1 (1950). See 30 MicH. L. REv. 610 (1932); 18
CALIP. L. REv. 159 (1930); 24 !LI.. L. REv. 826 (1930); 39 YALE L. J. 388 (1930).
55 Barrett, writing in 1947, pointed out that barely a half-dozen states had made forum
non conveniens a part of their procedure; in seven states there were indications that in a
proper case the doctrine might be applied; and in twelve states, where the doctrine had
been considered, it was rejected. Among the rejecting states are Illinois, Minnesota, and
Missouri, three of the states to which plaintiffs frequently transport tort actions. See
Barrett, "The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens," 35 CALIP. L. REv. 380 at 388 et seq.
(1947). Upon remand of the Mayfield case, the Supreme Court of Missouri decided that
its constitution and statutes required that Missouri courts be open for all Missouri citizens,
whether or not residents, and hence it was not within the discretion of the court to deny
jurisdiction in response to a plea of inconvenient forum because one or both of the parties
was a nonresident. State ex rel. Southern Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 362 Mo. 101, 240 S.W.
(2d) 106 (1951). Minnesota has similarly rejected the Douglas case by saying that its
statutes prevented the court from denying jurisdiction. Boright v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry.
Co., 180 Minn. 52, 230 N.W. 457 (1930).
56 25 Cal. (2d) 605, 155 P. (2d) 42 (1944), cert. den. 325 U.S. 866, 65 S.Ct. 1403
(1945). See 18 So. CAL. L. REv. 281 (1945); 58 HARv. L. REv. 877 (1945).
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preme Court denied certiorari, the continuing vitality of the Douglas
holding was made most questionable despite the fact that only a year
prior to the Leet case the Supreme Court had, in another connection,
quoted approvingly from a critical portion of the Douglas opinion.57
The likelihood of reversal for the Douglas decision increased, or
at least the probability that it would be closely limited to its facts increased, when Justice Jackson spoke for a five-to-four Court in Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert and said, citing the Kepner and Miles cases: "It
is true that in cases under the Federal Employers' Liability Act we
have held that plaintiff's choice of a forum cannot be defeated on the
basis of forum non conveniens. But this was because the special venue
act under which those cases are brought was believed to require it.
. . . Those decisions do not purport to modify the doctrine as to other
cases governed by the general venue statutes."58 In other words, the
absence or presence of a special venue provision would determine
whether forum non conveniens was constitutional. Two factors mitigated against concluding from the Gulf Oil decision that when next
presented with the opportunity the Court would decide that forum
non conveniens was inapplicable to PELA cases: (l) Justice Jackson
was clearly incorrect in finding that the Court had held in the Kepner
and Miles cases that forum non conveniens was inapplicable to PELA
actions; and (2) in the Gulf Oil case the Court reversed the court of
appeals for too narrowly construing the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
The enactment of section l 404(a),59 the "federal equivalent of
forum non conveniens," and the decisions holding that the section
applied as well to statutes containing special venue provisions as to
those having only general venue provisions,60 indicated that at least
the federal courts would not be available for abusive litigation under
the broad venue provisions of the PELA. But the decision in Ex parte
57 See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 at 120, 65 S.Ct. 459 (1945). The Douglas
decision had also received favorable attention in earlier dictum in McKnett v. St. Louis &
S. F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230 at 233, 54 S.Ct. 690 (1934).
58 330 U.S. 501 at 505, 67 S.Ct. 839 (1947).
59 See Braucher, "The Inconvenient Federal Forum,'' 60 HARv. L. REv. 908 at 930
et seq. (1947); Harris, "Survey of the Federal Judicial Code,'' 3 SooTIIWEST.GRN L. J.
229 at 235 et seq. (1949); 27 True. L. REv. 698 (1949) (dealing with the relationship
between §l404(a) and forum non conveniens); 41 CALIF. L. REv. 507 (1953); 29 N. C.
L. REv. 61 (1950); 64 HARv. L. REv. 1347 at 1352 et seq. (1951); 18 J.B.A. KAN. 242
(1949); 5 A.L.R. (2d) 1239 (1949); 10 A.L.R. (2d) 932 (1950).
60Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 69 S.Ct. 944 (1949) (FELA); United States v.
National City Lines, 337 U.S. 78, 60 S.Ct. 955 (1949) (Sherman Act). See 35 CoRN.
L. Q.' 459 (1950); 48 MicH L. REv. 366 (1950); 34 M:INN. L. REv. 145 (1950); 24
ToLANE L. REv. 247 (1949); 27 True. L. REv. 698 at 704 (1949).
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Collett, holding that section l 404(a) is applicable to FELA actions,
was also suggestive of a possible departure from the Court's thinking
in the Gulf Oil case, where it was concluded that the difference between a special and general venue provision determined whether forum
non conveniens was available. The problem was laid to rest in the
Mayfield case,61 for even though the Court split five to four, the dissent did not appear to object to the conclusion of the majority that the
Douglas case was still good law. Justice Frankfurter, for the Court,
declared that a state court should be freed from thinking that the
Kepner and Miles cases prevented the application of forum non conveniens to FELA actions and that the state court was free to decide
for itself whether the doctrine was to be available in the forum.

IV.

Conclusion: The Need for a Change

Today, unless the employer railroad succeeds in effecting a full
compromise agreement, it is unlikely that an employee can be prevented from bringing his FELA action in a distant, inconvenient state
forum. Nor is there a much greater likelihood that the railroad can
succeed in getting the inconvenient state forum to dismiss the action
in response to a plea of forum non conveniens. This is so since not
all states have made forum non conveniens a part of their procedure,
and even where the doctrine is available, its use is restricted. But
even more frustrating for the railroad is the fact that if it should convince the court to dismiss the plaintiff's action because of the inconvenience of the forum selected, this does not prevent the plaintiff from
then selecting another equally inconvenient state forum. So long as
there continue to be a large number of states unwilling to refuse jurisdiction over an FELA case, regardless of the inconvenience of the
forum, the abusive tactics permissible under the FELA, with its system
of interstate ambulance chasing, will prosper-and unfortunately the
prosperity is enjoyed not so much by the injured worked as by his
counsel. 62
The need for a remedy is clear; the source of the possible remedies
is likewise clear-congressional solution for the problem is required.
The solution might be thought to lie in amending the venue provision of the FELA to permit actions only at the plaintiff's residence
or at the place of injury. Such a proposed amendment has already
61 Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 at 5, 71 S.Ct. 1 (1950).
See 49 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1061 (1951).
62 See 15 Umv. Cm. L. R.Ev. 332 at 340 et seq. (1948).
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been before Congress, but as its critics rightly point out, it is too restrictive, since, for example, it may prevent an injured plaintiff from
suing in the state where he is hospitalized and where his medical
witnesses reside. 63 One recent suggestion urges the incorporation of
forum non conveniens as a substantive part of the PELA by conditioning "the grant of state court jurisdiction upon cognizance of
a timely motion for forum non conveniens . . . ." 64 There are at
least three objections to such a proposal: (1) it would permit state
courts to refuse to hear FELA actions; (2) it raises a serious constitutional question of how far Congress may go in requiring a particular procedure in a state court hearing cases which arise under
federal statutes; and (3) it does not prevent the plaintiff from again
instituting his action in a different inconvenient forum.
The most recent proposal for amending section 6 has been advanced by two writers who on previous occasions indicated their belief
in the superiority of FELA over workmen's compensation type coverage for railroad injuries and who apparently share Justice Jackson's
sentiment that it is "a rather fantastic fiction that a widow [can be]
harassing the . . . Railroad." 65 Mr. Richter and Mrs. Porer argue
that the applicability of section l 404(a) to FELA actions "has caused
expensive and time-consuming litigation. . . . The burden upon the
courts in determining. so vague a concept as inconvenience, when an
action was brought within the bounds of legal choice of districts, has
63 United States C<;mgress House Bill, H.R. 1639, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947)
(the so-called Jennings Bill). The bill aroused considerable attention; it was endorsed
in principle by the American Bar Association House of Delegates, 32 A.B.A.J. 493
(1946), and was further urged in Gay, ''Venue of Actions: Bill To Curb 'Shopping' for
Forums Is Urged,'' 33 A.B.A.J. 659 (1947). It received unfavorable comment in Devitt,
''Venue of Actions: Substitute for Jennings Bill (H.R. 1639) Is Urged," 34 A.B.A.J. 454
(1948). Also see 93 CoNG. fuc. 9178-9193 (1947); Hearings before Subcommittee
No. 4 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 1639, 80th Cong., 1st sess.
(1947); Hearings before a Subcommittee on the Judiciary United States Senate on S. 1567
and H.R. 1639, 80th Cong., 2d sess. (1948).
64 29 IND. L. J. 97 at 108 (1953). Also see Richter and Porer, "Federal Employers'
Liability Act," 12 F.R.D. 13 at 62 et seq. (1952).
65 Justice Jackson concurring in Miles v. illinois Central R. Co., 315 U.S. 698 at
706, 62 S.Ct. 827 (1942). For the views of writers Richter and Porer see "Federal
Employers' Liability Act-A Real Compensatory Law For Railroad Workers," 36 CoRN.
L. Q. 203 (1951); "Federal Employers' Liability Act," 12 F.R.D. 13 (1952). In the
latter article, at page 63, Mr. Richter and Mrs. Porer do recognize that "there has been
unfair advantage taken by plaintiffs in many cases . • • ,'' and would apparently permit
the application of forum non conveniens to PELA cases either where the defendant railroad does not operate in the venue selected by the plaintiff or where the venue selected
is not within a reasonable geographical distance from the site of the occurrence. It seems
that this position has now been abandoned by these writers. It is interesting to note that
the authors would reject inconvenience of the selected forum as a test because of its
vagueness, while "reasonable geographical distance" is seemingly thought to be free of
that difficulty.
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been great and unwarranted."66 Consequently the authors propose
amending section 6 to provide, among other things, that "no action
brought under this Act shall be transferred to any other district court
of the United States under 28 U.S.C. §1404(a), or otherwise, without the consent of all parties thereto." 67
It is submitted that there are at least five important objections to
this specific proposal and the attitude from whence it stems: (I)
although widows and injured employees may be unable to take advantage of railroad corporations, it has already been revealed that their
counsel frequently do not suffer the same infirmities; (2) if it is true
that inconvenience is a vague test, it is surely no more vague than
other standards utilized in determining the legal relations among individuals, and clearly it will become less vague as there develops a
body of case law from which the criteria of inconvenience may be
extracted; (3) it is either circular or immaterial to argue that there is
an undue burden on courts in requiring them first to decide the issue
of inconvenience when the action is ''brought within the bounds of
legal choice of districts," because the issue is not whether the action
is legally brought but whether the best interests of justice are promoted
by its maintenance in the particular court where it is admitted the
action is legally brought; ( 4) it is question-begging to assert that a prior
determination on the issue of convenience is "unwarranted," since
without presenting either evidence or argument the authors thereby
dismiss the very point in issue; and (5) even if it were thought desirable that forum non conveniens be declared inapplicable to PELA
actions the proposed amendment is inadequate, since it will affect only
federal courts unless the language of the proposed amendment is
ambiguous in that the words "or otherwise" are somehow intended to
affect the state court use of forum non conveniens. Should it be
intended that state courts are to be affected by the amendment, there
is then raised the question already mentioned as to whether Congress
may so regulate state court procedure.
Would not the evils be avoided and the plaintiff's interests still
protected if, as has been suggested,68 the PELA were amended to
make actions arising thereunder subject to the present general venue
statutes with concurrent jurisdiction in the state courts? Indeed, it
66 Richter and Porer, ''Proposed Changes in the Laws Governing Injuries in Interstate Transportation," 67 HARv. L. REv. 1003 at 1013 (1954).
67 Ibid. Emphasis supplied.
68 Devitt, ''Venue of Actions: Substitute for Jennings Bill (H.R. 1639) Is Urged,"
34 A.B.A.J. 454 (1948).
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has been argued with some persuasiveness that Congress · never intended section 6 to operate as anything other than a general venue
provision. On this view the purpose of section 6 was to ensure that
the ordinary venue provisions applicable in state courts would also
be applied to FELA aetions. That is, state courts would not be permitted to discriminate against FELA actions.69 If Congress should
now decide that FELA actions should be subject to the general venue
provisions, the Kepner and l\tliles cases would no longer be applicable
and the conscience of equity courts could be appealed to in order to
enjoin a truly vexatious choice of forum. 70 Since the present general
venue provision (28 U.S.C. §1391) permits a civil action to be
brought in the district of the defendant's residence or where the defendant corporation is incorporated, licensed to do business, or doing
business, the only important diminution from the plaintiff's present
choice of forum would occur where the situs of the accident was in
a district other than one where the railroad corporation was incorporated, licensed to do business, or doing business. However, it is
difficult to understand how there could be many such cases, and should
any arise it would not be improper for a court to find that for purposes of venue the railroad corporation was doing business in the
district where the accident occurs.
S. I. Shuman, S.Ed.
69 See Gibson, "The Venue Clause and Transportation of Lawsuits," 18 I.Aw AND
CoN'I'EM. PnoB. 367 at 380, 405, 414 et seq. (1953).
·
·
70 See Justice Frankfurter dissenting in both Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Kepner, 314
U.S. 44 at 56 et seq., 62 S.Ct. 6 (1941), and Miles v. illinois Central R. Co., 315 U.S.
698 at 715 et seq,, 62 S.Ct. 827 (1942).

